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Situating organizational action: the relational sociology of organizations 
Alistair Mutch, Rick Delbridge and Marc Ventresca 
 
 
 
Introduction 
This special issue seeks to address what we feel is a growing concern with the nature 
of theorizing about organizations and, in particular, how we understand and situate 
organizational action.  Our concerns are threefold. First is the concern that many of 
the accounts which centre on process and practice tend to downplay the importance of 
the broader settings in which such action takes place. Second is the worry that 
approaches such as new institutionalism tend to downplay the role of agency. More 
broadly, we have an increasing unease with the easy eclecticism – the mixing and 
muddling – of distinct and complex ideas and concepts that has become increasingly 
commonplace in organization studies.  These are issues that lie at the heart of 
sociological theorizing more generally and the position we outline below draws on the 
work of a number of social theorists.  The arguments we advance resonate in 
important ways with the points of view developed by Emirbayer (1997) in his 
‘manifesto for a relational sociology’.  Specifically, we share his focus on ontology, 
his emphasis on the primacy of contextuality and process in sociological analysis, an 
attention to causal explanation that seeks to avoid both pure voluntarism and 
structural determinism, a requirement for theoretical consistency across levels of 
analysis and an advocacy of evaluation and internal debate around the thematization 
of issues and problems in order to facilitate theory building within and across 
traditions.   
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In this paper we advocate a relational form of analysis and tease out what such an 
approach might mean for organization studies. This draws our attention to a number 
of connections that we outline in this introduction. In particular, we wish to 
emphasize some promising approaches that are echoed in the papers that follow, all of 
which share a commitment to a relational form of analysis. Some of this work, 
notably that of Bourdieu, is receiving more attention in mainstream debates (Ozbilgin 
and Tatli, 2005). However, this is often in a way, we would suggest, that tends not to 
deal with the detail of the approach but with some headline features. One argument 
that we present in this introduction, therefore, is the need to engage in a serious 
fashion with the full extent of the bodies of work that we highlight here rather than a 
partial and selective re-presentation of parts of a wider whole.  To do so will help 
researchers to recognize the nuances, variations and possibilities that lie within these.   
 
The connections we outline run in a number of directions. At one level there are the 
connections between organizations and their wider world. The concern to draw such 
connections, to recognize that organizations do not somehow float in a neutral 
‘environment’ but that their actions produce and reproduce the world that they 
inhabit, has been behind the use of terms such as ‘organizational field’ by some 
within new institutionalist approaches. Some would argue that the full import of such 
usages is not explored and that their proper investigation would lead to a useful debate 
with those heading, as it were, in the opposite direction, that is, from the outside of 
organizations inwards (Lounsbury and Ventresca, 2003). In the comparative business 
systems perspective, for example, there are suggestions that firmer connections are 
needed between broad institutional patterns discernible at national or regional level 
and the actions that occur within and between organizations. Whitley (2003), for 
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example, has recently suggested that the work of critical realists like Margaret Archer 
which we discuss below may be of value here.  
 
This latter suggestion points to the existence of another set of connections that we 
have anticipated above - those between organization theory and wider sociological 
and social theorizing. That the bulk of theorizing organization now takes place in 
business schools may well have contributed to the tendencies toward both a 
fragmentation of the discipline and a narrowing of focus in the resulting attenuation of 
the links between organization theory and broader forms of theorizing. We focus in 
the remainder of this introduction on three sets of approaches, all of which hail from 
outside the business school but all, we think, of considerable potential in revitalizing 
organization theory and rebuilding connections. We also have the task of showing that 
there are some interesting points of connection between these three approaches.  For 
example, and importantly, they each share a depth as well as breadth to their 
conceptualization of relations (i.e. they share a stratified ontology). To show points of 
connection, however, does not mean to erase or elide differences. We present these 
three approaches not as some sort of unified ‘answer’ to the problems of situating 
organizational action, but rather as promising frameworks which need further debate 
and discussion (in the spirit of Delbridge and Ezzamel, 2005).  
 
The three approaches we wish to explore in a little more detail share a location in the 
domain of sociology and social theory. The first, relational pragmatics, is the most 
clearly sociological in location and is derived from American pragmatism and its 
engagement with a number of European bodies of work. One of these constitutes the 
second approach that we wish to consider, that inspired by the work of the French 
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social theorist Pierre Bourdieu. Bourdieu was concerned with a wide range of social 
phenomena but not, until the latter stages of his work, with organizations directly. 
However, some of his terms, such as ‘field’, have been picked up and deployed within 
approaches such as new institutionalism. The concern of some is that in the process 
they have been divorced from their wider context in Bourdieu’s schema and so shorn 
of explanatory power. This is a question which we return to later. The third set of 
approaches are those based on critical realism, notably the morphogenetic approach of 
Margaret Archeri.   
 
It is important here for us to distinguish between critical realism as a philosophical 
approach and the substantive theories that make use of it.  Reed (2005a: 1632) notes 
that critical realism redefines the ‘explanatory task’ in organizational analysis and 
impacts on at least three key issues or dilemmas in social theory: the structure/agency 
problem, the status of, and relationship between, historical, structural and discursive 
analysis in social science, and in explaining social change.  In some ways, therefore, 
critical realism forms an underlying thread that can tie together our discussion of 
substantive theories that otherwise have significant differences in approach. In our 
discussion of these differences we will pay rather more attention to critical realism as 
a way of sorting out underlying issues of ontology that might help in furthering the 
connections that we identify. We consider a number of areas in greater depth. 
 
The first is the commitment of all three approaches to a realist ontology and it is here 
that we present a little more material on critical realism, material which also relates to 
current debates over, and interest in, the development of ‘scientific realism’ (a further 
connection that we could make). Building on this, we explore the commitment that all 
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three approaches share to a relational perspective on social phenomena. This leads us 
into a closer discussion of the nature of the relationship between agency and structure 
that the three approaches suggest. This area is by no means agreed between the three, 
but there are points of contact that suggest useful ways forward.  
 
The relational approach that is supported emphasizes the value of time in constructing 
analyses of concrete organizational developments, which leads us into some 
consideration of methodological issues. The emphasis here on the need to relate 
methods to the nature of the question being asked and to revise them in the course of 
investigations is clear. We consider each of these areas in a little more detail before 
suggesting some areas which still need further debate and clarification. We do not 
attempt a formal reconciliation between these three approaches, for that would be 
impossible in the space available (and probably unproductive), but we hope that by 
drawing these connections we can encourage others to pursue their many 
ramifications in what we feel would be a productive endeavour for those concerned 
with the relationship of organizational actions to the wider world. 
 
Ontological foundations 
We start, then, with a brief review of the ontological commitments of our three 
approaches. For those explicitly based on critical realism, this is straightforward, but 
the approaches of both Bourdieu and the relational pragmatists also seem compatible 
with a broadly realist ontology. Whilst this discussion might not be present in the 
work of Bourdieu himself, commentators have suggested that his ontological 
presuppositions are best characterized as realist (Fowler, 1997: 6). As there is 
considerable interest with some parts of organization theory in notions of scientific 
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realism (McKelvey, 2003) it is worth at this point considering the nature of critical 
realism and its relation to substantive theorizing in a little more detail.  
 
It is important at the outset to be clear about the claims being made by critical realism 
about the ‘truth’, particularly because some seem to align it with a search for an 
‘absolute truth’ (Inns, 2002).  Such claims are often made in passing with little sign of 
engagement with the literature, but they continue to pollute the terms of the debate. 
Referring to the work of Pinder and Bourgeois (**Alistair ref?), for example, Inns 
writes that they ‘represent the most extreme position of the critical realist strand, 
ignoring the arguments from, for example, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) that it is 
impossible to distinguish between literal and figurative language as ostensibly literal 
language turns out on closer inspection to be figurative’ (** Alistair – page number? ) 
 
What the position adopted by Pinder and Bourgeois actually represents is one much 
closer to the ‘scientific realism’ that we discuss further below (and one which ignores 
the realist position that Lakoff and Johnson espouse, in which metaphor is related to 
our embodied engagement with the world). For what one notes in the critical realist 
position is a much more tentative approach to issues of truth and reality than 
suggested by some critics. The focus is on ways of understanding and explaining the 
world whose results are always avowedly provisional and corrigible, but which are 
presented as outcomes subject to further adjudication and debate. This is not the world 
of grand narratives, but it is one in which positions are taken seriously. The focus is 
on the need for clarity of exposition and on the sincere and committed engagement 
with the ideas of others. The question of truth is perhaps nicely summed up by Hilary 
Rose when she observes that ‘[p]erhaps truth in the strong sense used by Rorty et al. 
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never exists outside the certainty of 'true forme', which I get when I read a poem or a 
novel’ (Rose, 1994: 25). What is central to critical realism, then, is not a claim to a 
privileged access to the truth, but a genuine attempt to formulate better means of 
understanding. 
 
In such means of understanding there is, of course, the fundamental metaphysical 
assumption that there is a world independent of our imagining of it. We cannot have 
any direct and unmediated access to this world, but we have not to tangle up our 
conceptions of the world with the existence of the world. Working from this initial 
premise, Bhaskar (1979) was concerned to explore what properties the world must 
possess for science to be possible. On this premise, he distinguished several levels of 
reality.  
 
On the surface are empirical events, those which are accessible as sense data and 
which form the basis of ‘commonsense’ or ‘naïve’ realism. Below these events is the 
actual, often accessible only through indirect means, such as the scientist’s electron 
microscope. However, this ‘scientific realism’ is not the full extent of the real, nor 
does it explain what scientists do, a position which might be contrasted to that which 
seems to be adopted in the ‘mainstream’ of organizational analysis (Boal, Hunt & 
Jaros, 2003; McKelvey, 2003). Rather, argues Bhaskar (1979), the real is to be found 
in the causal mechanisms that produce the event states that we record as the ‘actual’ 
and it is these causal mechanisms that scientists are concerned to identify and explore. 
These mechanisms might only operate within a particular range of constraints, and 
there may be other mechanisms that work to confound their operation. That is, 
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mechanisms may exist but not be activated, or their effects might be hidden by 
countervailing tendencies.  
 
Reality is also stratified and emergent. These twin concepts are nicely illustrated in 
the work of the biologist Stephen Rose (1993), whose explorations of the making of 
memory are located in a framework informed by Bhaskar’s work. The mind emerges 
from certain physical and biological properties, but it cannot be reduced to them. That 
is, a particular combination of physical and chemical properties gives rise to the 
biological apparatus of the brain, but this working cannot be reduced to a simple 
collection of individual parts. In turn, Rose’s experiments indicate that memory 
organizes as a self organizing system that depends on biological substances to 
operate, but cannot be reduced to any one part of this system. This allows Rose to 
resist the claims of genetic determinism and further allows us to posit the notion of 
the social as a distinct layer, dependent on the actions of people but not reducible to 
individuals. A key concept here is the notion of ‘emergent properties’, the idea that 
levels possess properties that are sui generis. Finally, the difference in levels also 
corresponds to an increasing openness and complexity. At some levels we may be 
able to attain closure, or it may be feasible for scientists to attain such closure through 
controlled experimentation. This allows for prediction, but in open systems there is 
increasing contingency which makes prediction problematic; laws give way to 
tendencies. At the level of human systems, all systems are open and further 
complexities need to be added. We have the operation of the ‘double hermeneutic’, 
that is, not only do we have to interpret the results of our observations, but our 
research subjects produce their own readings of the world (Outhwaite, 1987). 
Sometimes these readings incorporate our own and this makes the ‘scientific’ 
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isolation of variables a perilous business. This raises the central issues of contingency 
and free will. These make prediction fraught with difficulty and suggest that a more 
modest goal of explanation is appropriate for those exploring human activity. 
 
It is important that critical realism has not sought to separate off the works of natural 
and social science. There are the twin dangers, especially in more interpretivist 
traditions, of either ignoring the natural sciences and hence ceding a large part of the 
argument, or seeking to deny the methods and achievements of the natural sciences. 
Indeed, Bhaskar himself recognized the applicability of some of these ideas emerging 
from the philosophy of science in formulating his Transformational Model of Social 
Action. However, those ideas have in turn been critiqued by those from within the 
critical realist tradition, such as Archer, who are more familiar with broader social 
theorizing. The important point here is that critical realism is compatible with a wide 
range of substantive theories (Collier, 1994). There are no ‘master keys’ in critical 
realism but rather a commitment to act as a philosophical ‘under-labourer’ for the 
social sciences. The notions of the search for causal mechanisms and the emergence 
of phenomena over time are both important in the discussions that follow. The 
importance of time will be considered in more detail later, but it does form an 
important part of a commitment to relational forms of analysis. 
 
Relational analysis 
This commitment to a relational form of analysis is foregrounded in the work of 
Mustafa Emirbayer. Building on the work of Dewey in particular, but referencing a 
wide range of other authors, he suggests that we need to see ‘relations between terms 
or units as pre-eminently dynamic in nature, as unfolding, ongoing processes rather 
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than as static ties among inert substances’ (1997: 289).  This is elaborated in his 
discussion of causality which recognizes that social actors are embedded in space and 
time and respond to specific situations in ways that are not captured in accounts which 
reify structures as causal factors.  In taking an action orientation, however, Emirbayer 
(1997: 308) argues that a tendency to pure voluntarism must be avoided ‘by insisting 
upon a search for robust explanatory processes that operate across a multiplicity of 
social situations’.  This position clearly shares a great deal in common with that taken 
by critical realists such as Archer to which we return shortly.   
 
In the course of developing his argument for a relational sociology one of the authors 
Emirbayer draws on is Bourdieu, who has also championed a processual, relational 
view of the sociological enterprise. His focus has been on the emergence of order 
from practice, not through commitment to pre-established goals but emergent from 
the flow and flux of practice. There is, he argues ‘an economy of practices, a reason 
immanent in practices, whose 'origin' lies neither in the 'decisions' of reason 
understood as rational calculation nor in the determinations of mechanisms external to 
and superior to the agents’ (Bourdieu, 1990: 50). However, this commitment to 
processual analysis is dependent in turn on the centrality of the notion of habitus in 
imparting regularity to the outcomes of practice.  
 
For Bourdieu, habitus is the crucial link between structure and agency, but it is one 
that DiMaggio (1997) suggests may place too great an emphasis on experiential 
learning and so underplay the extent of other factors in shaping culture. In particular, 
he points to the promise of the notion of institutional logics as outlined by Friedland 
and Alford (1991). There are interesting links here to the conceptualization of agency 
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that Archer (2003) presents. These links work in two ways. One is the stress that 
Archer (1996) places on the relations between systems of ideas and actions that open 
up spaces for agential intervention. The second is the insistence on the emergence of 
agency from, but not its reduction to, embodied personhood (Archer, 2003). This 
allows for the integration of the insights from studies of cognition that DiMaggio 
(1997) draws attention to. However, the mobilization of such insights rests in part on 
a clear engagement with the central question of the nature of the relationship between 
agency and structure.  
 
This question lies at the heart of debates over the lack of attention to agency and 
interest with new institutionalism, as recognized by, for example, DiMaggio (1988). 
The theorists called in most frequently to repair the damage are Bourdieu and 
Giddens. Part of our problem, however, is the manner in which ideas are drawn from 
such thinkers in a way that both abstracts them from their broader context and 
misrecognizes key aspects of their use. The entry of Giddens via DiMaggio’s reading 
of Bourdieu, for example, perhaps explains the persistent use of ‘structuration’ to 
refer to the structuring of a field that does not seem to derive from Giddens’ use of the 
term (Scott, 2001). In turn the notion of the ‘field’ seems to be taken from Bourdieu, 
but in a fashion that abstracts it from its relationship to other core concepts like capital 
and habitus. These concepts need to be seen as part of a broader endeavour.  That 
endeavour is to overcome what is seen to be the false dualism between agency and 
structure; in the words of Wacquant ‘not simply to combine, articulate or join agency 
and structure but, more fundamentally, to dissolve the very distinction between these 
two seemingly antinomic viewpoints of social analysis’ (Waquant 1993:3).  
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This characterization of Bourdieu places him close to the ‘mutual constitution’ 
approach essayed by Giddens and, as such, in considerable opposition to the ideas of 
Archer that we examine further below. It is, therefore, worth explaining why we 
explore these ideas in more detail. Part of the reason is that it was Giddens on whom 
Bhaskar drew to develop his model of social action. But a more important reason is 
that it is Giddens who is most frequently drawn upon in a wide range of organization 
theory whenever it is that the wider context needs to be drawn in. However, the 
manner in which this is done often uses the ideas more as a rhetorical device in 
pointing to a recognition of a relationship rather than as an analytical device. This is 
sometimes done in a way that recognizes some of the problems that we discuss below 
but chooses to sidestep them. Here is what Barley and Tolbert (1997: 99) have to say:  
 
Although the critics of structuration theory have aimed their critique at 
problems they believe to be inherent to the theory's logic and, for this reason, 
have sometimes argued for re-establishing the separation between structure 
and action that Giddens sought to transcend [citing Archer], we submit that the 
worth of the critique actually lies in the epistemological rather than the 
ontological issues that it raises. 
 
Actually, when one reads the account that Barley and Tolbert present it is possible 
both to argue that their version of Giddens’ structuration theory seems divorced from 
the original and that, in practice, their account would be more congruent with 
Archer’s (1995) ideas. We can note similar fudging of these key questions elsewhere 
(Hendry, 2000; Heracleous and Hendry, 2000). The problem is that we need to be 
clear about the differences, as they lead to different logical entailments. Once again, 
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we return to our point earlier about the need for clarity and consistency in the use of 
concepts. We can see some of the problems involved through a closer examination of 
Archer’s critique of Giddens’ approach, a critique that is shared and drawn upon by 
Emirbayer and Mische (1998) in their development of notions of agency. 
 
Conceptualizing action 
For Archer (1995), those analysts who privilege the impact of structures on agents are 
‘downward conflationists’, in which actions are simply an epiphenomenon of deep 
structures. On this reading, once we have acquired the key to the structures, we can 
simply ‘read off’ the correspondent action. By contrast, those who focus on human 
interaction, such as the Symbolic Interactionists, are ‘upward conflationists’ for whom 
society is simply an aggregation of a myriad of individual interactions, with no 
discernible shape or pattern beyond these. Archer rejects both (as does Giddens) but 
finds that Giddens’ structuration resolves the tension by dissolving it altogether. Her 
solution, by contrast, is to insist on the importance of both agency and structure and to 
suggest that what is important is to explore the relationship between the two. This is 
the core of what she terms her ‘morphogenetic’ approach (‘The ‘morpho’ element is 
an acknowledgment that society has no pre-set form or preferred state: the ‘genetic’ 
part is a recognition that it takes its shape from, and is formed by, agents, originating 
from the intended and unintended consequences of their activities’ (Archer, 1995: 5)), 
which she formulates as follows: 
 
every morphogenetic cycle distinguishes three broad analytical phases 
consisting of (a) a given structure (a complex set of relations between parts), 
which conditions but does not determine (b), social interaction. Here, (b) also 
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arises in part from action orientations unconditioned by social organization but 
emanating from current agents, and in turn leads to (c), structural elaboration or 
modification - that is, to a change in the relations between parts where 
morphogenesis rather than morphostasis ensued. (Archer, 1995: 91) 
 
Such an approach draws on the notion of emergent properties, derived from Bhaskar’s 
work explored above, to argue that whilst society is quite clearly the product of 
human activity, it is not necessarily the product of those humans ‘here present’. That 
is, the previous activities of human actors create structures (institutions, roles, 
routines) that then both constrain and enable actors in the next round of activity. In 
each cycle, actors begin their interactions in a context which they did not create but 
which enables certain outcomes and makes others unlikely or difficult.  
 
To label them as unlikely or difficult does not, however, make them impossible. 
Agency is not determined by context, but has to take into account opportunity cost in 
exercising choice. Such choice, of course, may well not appear as such, with certain 
courses of action being practically unavailable in many contexts. However, the result 
of social interaction is structural elaboration, either change or stasis. It is down to 
empirical analysis to determine the content of each cycle, but a key part of such 
analysis will be an adequate exploration of the formative context. Time is therefore a 
critical dimension of this approach, as we will discuss shortly. 
 
Archer’s development of critical realism, therefore, preserves a strong commitment to 
a relational form of analysis in which agency and structure have to be held apart to 
explore the nature of both, and the relationship between their infolding development 
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over time. This commitment is shared by Emirbayer and Mische (1998) in their 
discussion of the nature of agency. Whilst their focus is on agency, this is quite 
clearly developed in relation to structures; for them it is: 
 
 the temporally constructed engagement by actors of different structural 
environments - the temporal-relational contexts of action - which, through the 
interplay of habit, imagination, and judgement, both reproduces and 
transforms those structures in interactive response to the problems posed by 
changing historical situations. (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998: 970) 
 
It is worth discussing the characterization of agency that both they and Archer derive 
in order to contrast it with that presented by Bourdieu, for some interesting 
connections emerge. Emirbayer and Mische suggest three dimensions to agency – 
interational, through an orientation to the past, practical evaluative, through an 
orientation to the present, and projective, through an orientation to the future – that 
are derived from their engagement with, in particular, the work of Mead. They 
suggest that much of the work in sociology has been concerned with the role of habit 
in conditioning agency, and they note both Bourdieu and Giddens in this regard as 
stressing this component. In their desire to suggest that present and future orientations 
also need consideration, they draw on Mead’s conception of the ‘internal 
conversation’. This is where an actor reflects upon their engagement with existing 
structures and can be the source of change.  
 
Interestingly, Archer’s (2003) most recent work also draws on this idea and develops 
the notion of the internal conversation as the key mechanism that bring actors into 
Po
st-
Pr
int
 16 
collision with structures. She suggests is that it is not good enough to simply outline a 
relationship between agency and structure; what we also need is an account of change. 
This, she argues, leads us to question why it is that some seek change, when others, 
placed in the same contexts, are content to accept existing arrangements. In this 
endeavour she places considerable emphasis on the delineations of forms of 
reflexivity. In contrast to, for example Giddens (1990), whose account of reflexivity 
stresses the knowledgeability of all actors in modernity, Archer suggests that there are 
different forms of reflexivity, based on the form of the internal conversation that is 
adopted. We all, she argues, conduct such conversations and use them to monitor and 
evaluate our fundamental moral projects, but we do this in different ways shaped by 
our involuntary positioning in social contexts.  
 
For some (the majority in her exploratory study), the internal conversation needs to be 
completed in the context of others. Concerns, that is, have to be verbalized and shared 
with others in order for resolution to be obtained. This group are the ‘conversational 
reflexives’ and their engagement with the world is characterized by measures to 
maintain continuity of context. In this they will tend to avoid contact with structures 
or work ‘with the grain’, in sharp contrast to the ‘autonomous reflexives’. The 
autonomous reflexive completes their own internal conversation in relative (and these 
terms are all relative) isolation from the concerns of others. This has the potential to 
bring them into conflict with and seek to change the structures which surround them. 
This feature is shared to some extent by the third category, that of the ‘meta 
reflexive’. The meta reflexive uses the internal conversation not only to monitor 
personal projects but also to reflect upon the process of reflection itself (thus more 
closely approaching Giddens’ conceptualization of reflexivity). This does not 
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necessarily lead to broader change, however, so much as to the dissatisfaction of the 
person with the nature of the world and their efforts in it. The final category is that of 
the ‘fractured reflexive’, the person who, for some reason, never acquires the ability 
to conduct a satisfactory internal conversation. These are society’s victims, never able 
to achieve their personal projects and remaining in the position of what Archer would 
term ‘primary agents’, that is, with their life chances determined to a significant 
degree by their involuntary positioning.  
 
The approaches of both Archer and Emirbayer and Mische to agency stand in 
considerable contrast to that essayed by Bourdieu. As we have seen, his focus on the 
importance of habitus, a set of durable dispositions to act that are transposable across 
contexts, tends for some critics to be stronger at explaining continuity rather than 
change (DiMaggio, 1997). By contrast, the approaches of both Archer and Emirbayer 
and Mische suggest orientations to both stasis and change. There is not the space here 
to attempt to map the two sets of ideas to each other, but this might be a fruitful 
endeavour. Archer’s categories, for example, might suggest why some adopt more 
projective forms of agency and hence, the roots of broader change. Both suggest the 
importance of time in organizational analysis, something shared by Bourdieu. These 
commitments have both ontological and methodological significance. The focus on 
emergence over time in Archer is central to the possibility of relational analysis, in 
shaping a world in which the contexts of action are given to those who have to take 
action within their constraints.   
 
Whilst we have pointed to some differences between the three approaches, a common 
link is the injunction that we have to pay due regard to the importance of time in our 
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analyses (Reed, 2005a, b). For Archer and others basing their ideas on critical realism, 
the key task is the construction of analytical narratives that explore situations over 
time with a view to uncovering causal mechanisms. Her earlier work on educational 
systems, for example, draws on a period of several hundred years to outline contrasts 
between different configurations, configurations which then shape distinctive patterns 
of action (Archer, 1979). For Emirbayer and Mische too time is central, given the 
definition of structures as ‘temporal-relational contexts of action’. And the historical 
development of fields is absolutely key to Bourdieu’s enterprise. His work on the 
importance of mental habits, particularly in fields of artistic endeavour, draws on 
sources such as Panofsky’s (1957) analysis of the links between medieval 
scholasticism and architecture.  
 
Methodological concerns 
The depth of historical understanding contained in the work of Archer and others, of a 
sense of context which is not something shaped in the past decade but rather over 
centuries, has been key to the development of a relational approach. This poses a 
problem for organizational scholars, oriented as they often are, partly through 
institutional pressures, to cross-sectional snapshots of time. This is not just a question 
of orientation or skills, but is often one of time and the availability of materials. It 
suggests that inter-disciplinary efforts are badly needed and that attempts to stimulate 
historical enquiry as a central part of organizational analysis (such as the recent 
journal Management and Organization History) are to be encouraged. 
 
Another methodological injunction can be derived from Bourdieu, that of the need to 
revise approaches as research projects develop.  That is, the importance needs to be 
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placed on the questions to be addressed, not the methods employed. In this, we can 
get some support from critical realism. Drawing on the work of Andrew Sayer, we 
can contrast the ‘ontological boldness’ of critical realism with its more relaxed 
approach to issues of epistemology. That is, while critical realists make bold claims 
about the nature of reality they are altogether more cautious in their epistemological 
claims. As Sayer argues, critical realism 
 
 accepts ‘epistemic relativism’, that is the view that the world can only be 
known in terms of available descriptions or discourses, but it rejects 
‘judgemental relativism’ – the view that one cannot judge between different 
discourses and decide that some accounts are better than others. (2000: 47) 
 
This means that critical realism is compatible with a wide range of methods, the 
crucial issue being the nature of the question to be addressed. That is, critical realists 
start by clarifying their ontological assumptions about the world and then proceed to 
the selection of methods. This means, for example, that there can be a place for 
statistical approaches, although, as Sayer cautions, ‘they are primitive tools as far as 
explanation is concerned’ (1992: 198). The key problem, however, for Sayer is the 
way in which a focus on technique hinders an exploration of underlying assumptions. 
Once again, we return to the centrality of ontological questions. 
 
However, this focus on ontology and a concomitant requirement for the systematic 
articulation of philosophical commitments and explanatory logics is something which 
is disquieting to many of those who might otherwise find several of the ideas 
espoused here of value. This seems to lie behind claims that critical realism, for 
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example, is an ‘imperialist’ enterprise which suggests that it has the master key to 
unlocking the mysteries of organizational life (see the debate between Reed, 2005a, b 
and Contu and Willmott, 2005). Quite clearly here, we have to strike a balance 
between the advocacy of a perspective because it seems to us to contain much of 
value and a measured approach to the gains to be made.  
 
Part of such an approach rests in recognizing the limitations that we outline above 
about the relationship between these forms of enquiry and the ‘truth’. The relationship 
is one of striving towards better forms of understanding whilst always recognizing 
that such attempts are provisional and subject to revision. An alternative concern is, 
by contrast, the notion that the ideas we are outlining are nothing new; that, in the 
words of Howard Aldrich (1992: 22) on new institutionalism, they are ‘just plain 
sociology’. Not only is there very little that is new, but a cause for concern is the way 
that previous analyses are retro-fitted into a particular category (Watson, 2006). In 
many senses this criticism is true, but it perhaps misses the mark. The concern is often 
that, whilst the ideas may seem nothing new, they are regularly ignored in 
contemporary forms of analysis, which seem to be fated to make the same mistakes 
because they ignore the rich legacy of ‘plain sociology’. One would want to draw a 
distinction here, difficult though it is, between the uses made of a body of ideas and 
the logical entailments contained in that body of ideas. The problem with many of the 
critiques of, say, critical realism is that they pick on one or two particular 
instantiations of the ideas and base their criticism on these, failing to recognize that 
such bodies of ideas are dynamic (Mutch, 2005) and contain substantial differences 
within them (Reed, 2005b). It is often the case that the criticisms are also ones which 
are the subject of debate within the body of ideas. Again to echo Emirbayer (1997), 
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these are not bodies of dogma to be followed slavishly, but rather living sets of ideas 
to be debated, refined and evaluated and whose value lies in the purchase that they 
give us on understanding the world. That they can be applied in different ways can be 
seen in the collection of papers that follows. 
 
The papers 
We start with two papers both seeking to develop aspects of the new institutionalist 
project by drawing on new sets of theoretical resources. For both the focus is the 
debate around the notion of the ‘institutional entrepreneur’, which has been seen as a 
key means of addressing DiMaggio’s (1988) critique of the lack of attention to 
questions of power, interest and intentionality. Bernard Leca and Philippe Naccache 
draw on critical realism to build a ‘non-conflating model of institutional 
entrepreneurship’. They argue that critical realism allows them ‘to move beyond 
actors’ discourses, decipher between context and structural mechanisms and highlight 
hidden power mechanisms.’ In turn they suggest that ‘recent developments in 
institutional analysis allow us to flesh out abstract notions of critical realism, such as 
‘structures’’, in this fashion demonstrating the value of mutual engagement between 
these two traditions. Interestingly, their conclusions also suggest that there may be 
merit in further drawing on Bourdieu, a theorist who supplies the key resources drawn 
upon in Julie Battilana’s paper. She is also concerned with the paradox of ‘embedded 
agency’ present in the institutional entrepreneurship debate and seeks to build an 
account that more rigorously delineates the spaces for action generated by social 
positions. In drawing on Bourdieu she eschews the frequent focus on habitus in favour 
of his notion of the field. She suggests that the merit of such an approach is that it sets 
up the ‘micro foundations for the development of a theory of institutional 
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entrepreneurship’. It also, she suggests, opens up some promising lines of inquiry that 
we could relate to the notions of agential orientation that we alluded to above in 
drawing on the work of both Archer and Emirbayer and Mische, and which also come 
out in one of our other papers. 
 
This next pair of papers illustrate two contrasting approaches to the application of 
broader institutional perspectives to particular domains. They both feature a detailed 
focus on particular subject domains but the direction of the approach is different in 
each. For Steve Fleetwood and Anthony Hesketh the move is in from a detailed 
specification of a critical realist meta-theory to assist in the development of domain 
specific concepts in understanding the debate over the putative link between human 
resource management and organizational performance. They use the resources of 
critical realism to engage in a detailed critique of existing positions, showing how 
such positions confuse empirical correlations (or lack of them) with a properly causal 
account. They suggest that critical realism, by supplying them with ontological 
clarity, is a more fruitful approach. Interestingly, they suggest that attention needs to 
be paid to what they term ‘reflexive performance’, something which they illustrate 
through extensive quotes from practitioners. By contrast, Paul Edwards, Monder Ram, 
Sukanya Sen Gupta and Chin-ju Tsai seek to build from within extensive work on 
small firms, and in particular employment relations within such firms, to develop a 
framework from analysis drawing upon the existing strengths of an institutionalist 
approach. They argue that whilst there has been much fruitful empirical work a more 
structural framework is needed to build explanatory accounts. They develop such a 
framework drawing upon extensive work in ‘low value added’ firms, a category 
which they argue ‘provide a useful context in which to examine the interplay of 
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different domains.’ The importance of their framework, they suggest, ‘is its 
underlying logic of giving shape to the many powerful insights of institutional 
theory’.  
 
Renate Meyer helps to remind us of some of those insights in her valuable review 
essay, which also has value in opening up areas of literature and research likely to be 
unfamiliar to many with access only to English language material.  For example, she 
notes that in the collected essays of Luckmann that she reviews there is a clear focus 
on power and suggests that ‘[i]f we do not pay enough attention, it is our research foci 
that distract us and not the framework’. This is a powerful reminder that all too often 
our views of a particular approach are taken through a chain of interpretation that 
frequently results in the misattribution of positions. Meyer’s engagement with this 
literature also points to some interesting observations about the nature of the 
institutional entrepreneur, something which is an important sub-theme in our papers. 
She warns us in particular about the dangers of meaning attribution based on 
retrospective reflection: ‘we need’, she suggests, ‘to differentiate carefully when 
assuming that these actors strategically pursue their interests’. This is a welcome 
reminder, as are some intriguing notes on methodology. In particular, one notes with 
interest the recommendation for ‘artificial stupidity and slowness’ in hermeneutic 
approaches; this move accords with the need for the reflexive monitoring and 
changing of research approaches that we find in Bourdieu but conflicts with the 
demands to publish speedily that are institutionalized in many contemporary research 
settings. 
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These papers, then, suggest a number of different approaches to the institutional 
shaping of organizational action. They all suggest valuable ways of reshaping 
contemporary debates in a number of domains. One challenge for our authors has 
been to combine theoretical rigour with empirical illustration, something which is 
extremely challenging in the context of the space available in journals. One critique of 
approaches such as critical realism is that they are long on theoretical exegesis, short 
on empirical application. Whilst fair in a number of cases, such a criticism in its turn 
fails to pay due attention to the material conditions of publication. Several of our 
papers point to supporting work published elsewhere and it is important that we judge 
work across the full range. However, such a strategy also points to the argument that 
it is perhaps better and more valuable to develop arguments with a combination of 
theoretical and empirical work at book length. A powerful recent example is Tony 
Elger and Chris Smith’s work on Japanese firms and their ‘transplantation’ into the 
United Kingdom. The fruits of a decade of detailed work employing a range of 
methods – comparative case study analysis, observations, in-depth interviews – this 
deploys a specifically critical realist framework which builds on work in a number of 
traditions to ‘identify the fundamental social relations and processes that underpin and 
condition the specific institutional patterns and organizational practices that 
characterize the evolution of competing capitalisms and competing firms’ (Elger and 
Smith, 2005: 68). At the same time they stress both collective and individual agency 
in a way which can best be displayed when there is sufficient space to elaborate on the 
details of contest, negotiation and accommodation. Our authors have not had such a 
degree of space but we thank them for their collective efforts in demonstrating the 
continuing value of the search for more helpful ways of situating organizational 
action. 
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Concluding remarks 
In this introduction we have advanced a relational sociology of organizations that 
seeks to address a number of key concerns with the way in which organization studies 
has been developing.  We have advocated an historically and institutionally grounded 
approach which both recognizes and explores the constraining and enabling character 
of social structures and the prospects of agency on the part of social actors.  We 
acknowledge that this is far from novel but it does require us to make explicit our 
ontological assumptions and to engage with various methodological concerns.   
 
Our more specific purpose has been to identify, describe and begin to build 
connections between related but largely independent bodies of work that provide 
potential insights for our understanding of social phenomena.  In this we have been 
very keen to avoid, and to argue explicitly against, the easy eclecticism or ad hoc 
reasoning that too often characterizes the selective (mis)representation of various 
social theories in their application in organization studies.  The development of the 
field of organization theory will benefit from the self conscious and reflexive 
engagement and debate both within and across our various research positions and 
traditions only if such debates are conducted on the basis of holistic evaluations and 
interpretations that recognize (and value) difference. 
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i Unfortunately, space limits preclude us including a discussion of the work of Norman Fairclough.  His 
‘Critical Discourse Analysis’ is based on an explicitly critical realist social ontology, rejecting the 
tendency for the study of organization to be reduced to the study of discourse and instead locating the 
analysis of discourse ‘within an analytically dualist epistemology which gives primacy to researching 
relations between agency … and structure’ (Fairclough, 2005: 916).  His work is in keeping with our 
arguments in this paper, in that it rejects ‘extreme social constructivist positions’ and focuses on the 
relations between linguistic/semiotic elements of the social and other (including material) elements.   
